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The! present! crisis! has! prompted! regulatory! authorities! to! implement! directives! regulating! future!
authorities’! actions! in! resolving! systemic! banking! crises.! Recent! findings,! however,! document! that!
only!a!small!portion!of!banks!have!recovered!as!a!result!of!government!intervention.!In!the!present!




banks! that! receive!government! support!are!more! likely! to! face!bankruptcy! than!banks! that!do!not!
receive!government!support.!We!argue!that!government!interventions!must!be!sufficiently!large!and!
that!an!optimal!banking!recovery!program!should! include!a!deep!restructuring!process.!Our!results!
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The! mortgage! crisis! has! demonstrated! the! weakness! of! regulatory! authorities! and! countries’!
institutional! systems! in! responding! to! and! resolving! banking! sector! problems.! Many! decisions!





their! recovery,! and! thus! economic! growth,! more! difficult.! The! poor! record! of! most! countries! in!
resolving! the! mortgage! banking! crisis! motivated! regulators! to! adopt! various! recommendations! in!
shaping! future! regulatory! responses! to! systemic! banking! crises! (see,! for! example:! “Issues! and!
Assumption! for! the!Design! of! an!Upgraded!Bank!Resolution! Framework”,! The!World! Bank!Report,!
2012;! ”Technical!Details! of! a! Possible! EU! Framework! for! Bank!Recovery! and!Resolution”,! Brussels,!
2012;!“A!Special!Resolution!Regime!on!UK!Banking!Act”,!Bank!of!England,!2009;!“Resolution!Policies!
Acts! on! Restoring! the!Distressed! Institutions”! in! Ireland,!Germany,! and!Denmark;! Dodd>Frank!Act,!
2010).!Despite! some!minor!differences!between!national!documents,!most! countries! implemented!
similar! approaches.! The! recommended!policy! instruments! include!blanket! guarantees! and! liquidity!
provisions! for! the! initial! stage! of! the! crisis;! and! capital! injections,! asset! repurchases,! and! debt!
restructuring!programs!for!the!resolution!of!banks’!balance!sheet!problems.!!
Despite! regulators’! recent! initiatives,! the!existing! literature!has!presented!no!clear!evidence!of! the!
effectiveness! of! recommended! government! intervention! instruments! in! restoring! banking! sector!
stability.!This!question! is! further!raised!by!recent!empirical!evidence!in!di!Patti!and!Kashyap!(2010)!
that! only! one>third! of! banks! that! received! government! assistance! have! recovered.! Based! on! the!
theoretical! literature!there!are!at! least!three!hypotheses.!First,!the!decisions!to! intervene!might!be!
political! in! nature! and! not! driven! by! banks’! fundamentals.! As! a! result,! interventions! might! be!




do! not! address! the! problems! of! specific! distressed! banks.! This! might! be! due! to! an! inadequate!
strategy!relative!to!a!bank’s!problems!or!the!insufficient!scale!of!an!intervention,!hampering!a!bank’s!
recovery! (Hoshi! and! Kashyap,! 2010;! Giannetti! and! Simonov,! 2013).! Finally,! di! Patti! and! Kashyap’s!
(2010)! results! may! be! attributable! solely! to! the! ineffectiveness! of! policy! measures.! Delays! in!
implementation,! the! passiveness! of! regulators! in! implementing! restructuring! measures,! and! the!
policy! of! restraint! often! exercised! by! politicians! may! undermine! the! effectiveness! of! policy!
instruments!(Kane,!1989;!Boot!and!Thakor,!1993;!Dewatripont!and!Tirole,!1994;!Morrison!and!White,!
2013).!
On! this! basis,! we! argue! that! government! interventions! can! only! be! effective! in! resolving! banking!
sector! distress! when! appropriate! and! timely! support! goes! to! the! institutions! most! in! need! of!
assistance.! The! present! study! raises! these! issues! and! attempts! to! determine! the! effectiveness! of!




sector! stability;! and! finally,! if! so,! which! intervention! mechanisms! are! most! important! to! banking!
sector!recovery?!




bank.! Additionally,! we! also! control! for! the! timing! of! government! support.! The! difference>in>
differences!(DID)!approach!employed!in!our!analysis!offers!several!advantages.!First,!it!enables!us!to!
compare! the! performance! of! banks! within! the! same! country! that! received! assistance! to! those! of!
banks! that!did!not! receive! assistance!during! the! year!of! the! intervention! and! thereafter.!We!have!
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identified! 118! non>supported! banks! with! similar! specializations! and! size! to! those! covered! by! the!
bailout!programs.!We!analyze!the!performance!of!banks!over!a!five>year!period,!which!captures!the!
average! duration! of! the! business! cycle! (NBER,! 2010).! Moreover,! our! DID! approach! allows! us! to!
partially!control!for!the!supported!banks’!level!of!distress!and!the!timing!of!the!policy!intervention.!If!
supported!banks!are!highly!distressed!relative!to!other!banks,!this!could!indicate!that!support!from!
the!government!arrived! too! late,! and! that! such! institutions! require!policy!measures!different! from!
those!undertaken!(Acharya!and!Yorulmazer,!2007;!Freixas!and!Parigi,!2008).!!
Second,!our!methodology!allows!us!to!examine!the!supported!banks’!performance!in!the!post>crisis!
period! relative! to! their! initial! performance! levels,! enabling! an! assessment! of! the! effectiveness! of!
policy! interventions.!Should!assisted!banks’!performance! improve! relative! to! the! initial!period,! this!
could! indicate! that! the! intervention!mechanisms!were! successful.! If! the! assisted!banks’! conditions!
deteriorate!relative!to!the!intervention!period,!and!relative!to!other!banks,!this!might!indicate!failure!
in! the! intervention! mechanisms.! Finally,! under! this! approach,! we! can! control! for! endogeneity.!
Weaker! initial! positions! in! the! pre>crisis! period!may! result! in! a! worse! post>intervention! condition!
compared!to!other!banks.!In!such!cases,!recovery!requires!time,!and!does!not!necessarily!imply!that!




The! remainder! of! the! paper! is! organized! as! follows.! Section! 2! describes! the! relevant! crisis!
containment! and! resolution!policies! recommended! in! government!documents;! Section!3!describes!
the!data!and!methodology;!Section!4!presents!the!empirical!results!with!respect!to!the!determinants!








banking! crisis! in!many! industrial! countries! prompting! the! implementation! of! various! strategies! to!
rescue! the! distressed! banking! sector.! In! the! aftermath,! many! governments! and! international!
institutions,! including!the!World!Bank!and!IMF,!started!work!on!Banking!Sector!Resolution!Plans!to!
establish! future! government! actions! to!be! taken!during! such! crises.! These! actions! are! intended! to!
avert,! in! a! timely! and! effective!manner,! contagion! effects! of! crises! and! restore! confidence! in! the!
financial!sector.! In! later!stages,!these!should!promote!banking!sector!restructuring!and!enable! it!to!
regain!stability.!Apart!from!minor!differences!between!country>level!documents,!the!recommended!
strategies!are! similar! and! rely!on! the!experiences!of! countries! in!previous! systemic!banking! crises.!
These!include!blanket!guarantees!and!liquidity!provisions!for!the!containment!stage!of!the!crisis;!and!
capital! injections,! asset! purchases,! and! debt! restructuring! programs! for! the! resolution! of! banks’!
balance!sheet!problems.!
In!the!initial!stage!of!the!crisis,!uncertainty!and!a!loss!of!confidence!in!the!financial!system!may!lead!
to! runs! on! deposits! at! distressed! banks.! This! depositors’! behavior! quickly! dries! up! the! liquidity! of!
affected!banking!institutions,!and!more!importantly,!increases!the!risk!of!contagion!to!other!healthy!
banks,! a! situation! that!may! cause! the! interbank!market! to! freeze.!Without! a! timely! and! effective!
intervention!from!central!banks,!bank!assets!deteriorate!further,! leading!to!potential!bankruptcy!at!
these!institutions!in!the!final!stage.!It!is!at!this!stage!of!the!crisis,!that!central!banks!tend!to!step!in!by!
offering! blanket! guarantees! and! injecting! liquidity! into! banks.! These! instruments! are! intended! to!
restore!confidence!and!provide!the!banking!sector!with!needed!liquidity.!
The! second! stage! of! the! crisis! requires! complex! mechanisms! to! restructure! the! banks’! balance!
sheets.! Most! recently,! various! countries! have! implemented! Resolution! Acts! to! address! banking!
sector! problems.! These! strategies! include! government>assisted! mergers! and! acquisitions! (M&As),!
debt! write>downs,! asset! separation! involving! transfers! of! non>performing! assets! to! newly! created!
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institutions,! and! as! a! last! resort,! nationalization! of! distressed! institutions.! Government>assisted!
M&As!involve!government!help!to!find!an!acquirer!for!a!troubled!bank.!In!practice,!the!government!
participates!in!restructuring!a!bank’s!debt!by!taking!it!over!to!improve!the!chance!of!success!of!this!




industry! as! a! whole! has! sufficient! resources! to! absorb! the! failing! bank.! Therefore,! this! type! of!
intervention! is! often! used! in! the! initial! phase! of! a! crisis.! In! addition,! this! bailout! strategy! is!
psychologically! advantageous,! as! no! institution! is! treated! as! a! loser.! Importantly,! as! government>
assisted!M&A!transactions!do!not!assume!shareholder!approval,!and!since!the!distressed!institution!
operates!on!a!stand>alone!basis,!this!may!strengthen!market!monitoring!mechanisms.!







big! to! fail”! institutions! when! market! transactions! are! not! possible! while! limiting! the! costs! of!
resolution.!The!advantage!of!this!strategy!is!that!it!does!not!require!the!government!to!capitalize!the!
newly!created!institution.!
Nationalization! involves!the!capitalization!of!distressed! institutions!with!national! funds! in!exchange!
for! ownership! in! the! institution! to! prevent! the! bank’s! bankruptcy,! and! thus! limiting! the! negative!
consequences! of! its! distress! for! the! banking! sector.! This! is! especially! common! with! systemically!
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important! banks.! However,! it! is! also! one! of! the!most! costly! forms! of! intervention! in! the! banking!
sector.!!
The!current!Resolution!Acts!stress!the! importance!of!well>conducted!restructuring!for!the!recovery!
of!banking!sectors,! recommending!two!possible!methods! to! restructure! the!bad!debt!of!distressed!
banks:!writing!it!off!at!a!cost!to!taxpayers,!and!creating!a!restructuring!fund!such!as!a!“Bad!Bank”!or!
an!“Asset!Management!Company! (AMC).”!Under! the! first! strategy,! the!government! takes!over! the!
institution’s!bad!debt!to!the!amount!of!the!fall!in!value!of!the!bank’s!assets,!recapitalizing!the!bank!
and! enabling! it! to! remain! in! the! market.! The! assumption! behind! this! mechanism! is! that! the!
government!does!not!participate!in!any!bank!operations,!allowing!the!disciplinary!mechanisms!of!the!
market! to!work! (Dell’Ariccia!and!Ratnovski,!2012).!By!contrast,! through! the!AMC!mechanism,!non>
performing! loans! are! transferred! from! a! distressed! institution’s! balance! sheet! to! a! newly! created!
fund.!The!fund!cleans!up!the!bank’s!balance!sheet!and!restores!the!bank’s!profitability,!then!tries!to!





on! banks’! performance.! Theory! suggests! that! government! interventions! should! positively! affect!
banks’!performance!due!to!reductions!in!refinancing!costs,!the!restructuring!of!distressed!debt,!and!
improved!capital! ratios!due!to!capital! injections.!Empirically,!Hakenes!and!Schnabel! (2010)!support!
this! argument,! documenting! that! government! interventions! increase! banks’! profitability! due! to!
access!to!more!favorable!funding.!Similarly,!Cordella!and!Yeyati!(2003)!argue!that!liquidity!provisions!
positively! affect!banks’! capital! and! improve!banks’! charter! values.!However,!Berger! and!Bouwman!










asset!quality.!Ding!et!al.! (2012)!document! that!government! interventions! in!Asian!economies!have!
improved!all!six!financial!indicators!in!terms!of!solvency,!credit!risk!and!profitability,!compared!with!
the! pre>crisis! period.! In! addition,! regulatory! actions! may! restrict! the! banking! business! and! thus!
discipline!bank!management! (Dam!and!Koetter,!2012).!Government! interventions!are!also! likely! to!
strengthen! banks’! monitoring! incentives,! which! should! hasten! banks’! recovery! (Dell’Ariccia! and!
Ratnovski,! 2012;! Mehran! and! Thakor,! 2011).! Recently,! the! empirical! literature! has! found! that!
government! interventions! are! not! as! effective! as! initially! assumed! in! the! theoretical! literature.! Di!
Patti! and! Kashyap! (2010)! argue! that! only! one>third! of! banks! recover,! given! regulatory! support.!
Tahoun! and! van! Lent! (2010)! and! Duchin! and! Sosyura! (2012)! show! that! government! interventions!
might! be!motivated!by!political! interests.! The! authors! show! that,! as! a! result,! politically! connected!
institutions! are! more! likely! to! receive! government! support! than! other! private! institutions.! The!
evidence!whether!these!banks!indeed!need!a!help!is!ambiguous!in!the!existing!literature.!Faccio!et!al.!
(2006)! and! recently! Iannotta! (2007)! document! that! though! politically! connected! institutions! are!
more! likely! to! receive! government! support,! they! also! exhibit! weaker! performance! at! the! time! of!
intervention!than!private!institutions.!On!the!other!hand,!Gropp!et!al.!(2011)!document!that!bailouts!
offer! banks! the! access! to! cheaper! capital! and! thus! banks!may! want! to! profit! from! governmental!
actions.! Thus,! we! might! expect! that! not! necessarily! weaker! banks! will! apply! for! the! government!
money;! however! we! might! expect! that! those! with! politically! connections! will! be! more! likely! to!
receive! it! (Faccio!et! al.,! 2006).! Indeed,! the! report! IMFGFR! (2007,!Chapter!3,! p.7)! shows! that!more!
capitalized! investment!banks,! and! in! some!countries!also! commercial!banks!with!a! better! financial!
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assistance! is! granted,! a! period! when! a! bank’s! liquidity! crisis! may! become! transformed! into! an!
insolvency! crisis.! This! effect!might! also!be!due! to! a! lag! in! the! accounting! system.!A!bank!may!not!
recognize!its!problems!at!the!time!when!support!is!offered,!while!its!situation!may!later!deteriorate!
dramatically! (James,! 1991;! Bennet! and! Unal,! 2009;! Hoshi! and! Kashyap,! 2010).! In! addition,! some!
studies!argue!that!the!effectiveness!of!government!interventions!depends!on!the!size!and!design!of!
the! government! program.! Giannetti! and! Simonov! (2013)! document! that! when! the! amount! of!
government!support! is!not!sufficient! to!resolve!a!bank’s!problems!and!to!build!a!significant!capital!
buffer!for!the!future,!such!a!bank!has!an!incentive!to!increase!its!risky!activities.!Similarly,!Brei!et!al.!
(2013),! examining! rescue!packages! in!Western!economies!during! the!1995>2010!period,!document!
that! recapitalization!helps!banks! recover!only!once! the! injected!capital!exceeds!a!critical! threshold!
and! a! bank’s! balance! sheet! is! sufficiently! strengthened.! With! respect! to! the! effectiveness! of!
intervention! programs,! Schnabel! (2004)! documents! that! only! liquidity! provisions! combined! with!
blanket! guarantees! can! restore! confidence! in! the! banking! sector! and! thus! the! liquidity! of! banks.!
However,!House!and!Masatlioglu!(2010)!argue!that!liquidity!injection!programs!will!not!be!effective!if!
a! bank! has! substantial! debt! overhang,! with! the! bank! remaining! undercapitalized,! although! its!
liquidity!position!is!improved.!Nonetheless,!cleansing!a!bank’s!balance!sheet!of!toxic!assets!improves!
a! bank’s! charter! value! and! thus! gains! the! bank! more! favorable! access! to! capital.! However,!
Bhattacharya!and!Nyborg!(2010)!argue!that!if!a!bank!experiences!a!debt!overhang,!equity!injections!
and! asset! purchase! programs! should! be! used! to! improve! the! bank’s! capital! position.! Finally,! the!
experiences!of!many!countries,!especially!Japan,!Sweden!and!the!U.S.,!show!that!the!effectiveness!of!
bailout!mechanisms! depends! on! a! country’s! institutional! structure.! Jonung! (2009)! argues! that! the!
reason!why! several! bailout!measures! did! not!work! during! the!worldwide!mortgage! crisis! of! 2007>
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2010,! although! such! measures! worked! well! during! the! Swedish! crisis,! relates! to! differences! in!
countries’! institutional! environments.! Strong! transparency! and!disclosure!mechanisms,! supervisory!
authority!able!to!impose!needed!restructuring!in!the!banking!sector,!and!a!limited!governmental!role!
in! the! debt! restructuring! process,! accompanied! by! large>scale! protection! of! banks! by! the!





We! analyze! the! effectiveness! of! specific! government! measures! in! resolving! banks’! problems.! In!




those! supported! by! government! intervention! with! those! that! did! not! receive! such! support.! The!




government! intervention! in! a! bank,! allowing! a! comparison! of! bank! performance! at! the! time! of!
intervention,!and!over!the!following!five!years.!A!five>year!period!to!captures!the!average!length!of!a!




There! are! therefore! two! sources! of! variation:! the! time! during! and! following! a! government!
intervention,! and! the! cross>section! of! banks! that! received! support! versus! those! that! did! not.!We!
estimate!the!following!regression:!!
Yi,c,t!=!Ac+α1)*Xi,)c,t)+)α2)*Zc,t)+)α3)*(Intervened)*After)the)crisis))+)α4)(Non=Intervened)*After)the)crisis))+)εi.c.t) ))))))(1)











a!dummy!variable! that! takes!a! value!of!one! if! a!bank!has! received!government! support,! and!Non>
intervened! is! a! dummy! variable! that! takes! a! value! of! one! if! a! bank! has! not! received! government!
support.! After! the! crisis! is! a! dummy! variable! that! takes! a! value! of! one! for! all! years! after! the!
government!intervention!and!zero!for!the!year!in!which!a!government!intervenes.!Finally,!εi,b,t! is!an!
error! term.! The! key! variables! of! interest! are! the! interaction! terms! Intervened*After! the! crisis! and!
Non>Intervened*After!the!crisis.!We!are!interested!in!the!difference!between!these!two!variables!to!










measure,! capital! ratio,! and! the! liquidity! ratio.! These! three! ratios! have! been! used! widely! in! the!
existing! literature! (Laeven! and! Levine,! 2009;! Gropp! et! al.,! 2011).!We! focus! on! these! performance!
measures! as! they! also! determine! the! probability! of! a! bank’s! bankruptcy.! The! aim! of! government!
interventions! is! to! restore! a! bank’s! financial! condition! and! prevent! bankruptcies.! Analyzing! the!
change! in! the! level! of! these!measures! will! provide! answers! to! the! question! of! how! effective! the!





capital>asset! ratio! divided! by! the! standard! deviation! of! asset! returns.! It! is! defined! as! a! z>score! =!
(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA),!where!ROA! is! the!rate!of!return!on!assets,!CAR! is! the!ratio!of!equity!to!assets,!
and! σ(ROA)! is! an! estimate! of! the! standard! deviation! of! the! rate! of! return! on! assets! as! a!moving!
average.!The!z>score!indicates!the!number!of!standard!deviations!that!a!bank’s!return!on!assets!must!
drop!below!its!expected!value!before!equity!is!depleted!and!the!bank!becomes!insolvent!(Boyd!and!













Our!primary! interest! is! in!the!effects!of!various! intervention!mechanisms!on!a!bank’s!performance.!
To! this! end,! we! include! five! intervention! mechanisms! in! our! regressions,! as! well! as! a! general!
intervention!dummy.!The!latter!exclusively!captures!the!effect!of!any!kind!injection!into!a!distressed!











with! higher! ratios! of! non>interest! activities! (De! Jonghe,! 2010).! In! addition,! the! design! of! the!




have! lower! capital! ratios! (Kwan! and! Eisenbeis,! 1997;!Williams,! 2004).! Following! these! studies,!we!
include! a! cost! to! income! ratio! (Efficiency)! to! control! for! operating! efficiency.!Additionally,!we! also!
include!return!on!assets!(ROA)!to!control!for!the!magnitude!of!financial!shock!affecting!each!financial!
institution.!We!expect!that! intervention! is!more! likely!for!banks!with!weaker!financial!performance!
and! will! require! more! time! to! recover.! We! also! control! for! bank! size,! defined! as! total! assets! (in!
logarithmic! form)! (Asset),!a!variable!used!to!measure!a!bank’s!market!power,!returns!to!scale,!and!
diversification!benefits.!Larger!banks!are!more!likely!to!be!heavily!affected!by!the!crisis!than!smaller!
banks,!and! thus! require!more!complex! resolution!measures! (Dam!and!Koetter,!2012).!Additionally,!
they!are!more!likely!to!receive!support,!due!to!their!systemic!importance.!We!control!for!a!country’s!
macroeconomic! environment! by! including! GDP! growth! (Gdpgrowth)! and! the! inflation! rate! (in!
logarithm)! (CPI).! We! assume! that! bank! recovery! will! be! negatively! affected! as! a! crisis! worsens.!
Finally,! we! capture! the! differences! between! countries’! institutional! structures! by! including!
institutional! variables,! including! explicit! deposit! protection,! capital! adequacy! requirements,! and!
strength! of! domestic! supervisors! in! imposing! changes.! Existing! research! has! shown! that! stronger!
institutional!environments!may! increase! the!effectiveness!of! regulatory! intervention!measures!due!
to!the!role!of!market!mechanisms!(Dam!and!Koetter,!2012;!Dell’Ariccia!and!Ratnovski,!2012).!Finally,!
we! include! the! level! of! concentration! of! the! banking! sector! (Concentration),! measured! as! the!
percentage!of!banking!system!assets!held!by!the!three!largest!banks.!We!expect!that!systemic!crises!









The! countries! differ!with! respect! to! development! stage,! the! nature! and! depth! of! their! crises,! the!
structure! of! their! banking! sectors,! and! government! reactions! to! systemic! banking! crises.!Most! of!
sample! consists! of! developing! countries,!with! only! five! out! of! twenty>five! classified! as! developed.!
This! is! not! surprising,! as! Kaminsky! and! Reinhart! (1999)! document! that! crises! are! much! more!
prevalent! in!emerging!economies!than! in!developed!economies.!Moreover,!regarding!the!extent!of!
government!involvement!in!banking!crises,!intervention!was!more!common!in!developing!nations.!In!
particular,! in!countries! such!as! Indonesia,!Columbia,!or!Malaysia,! the!government! support! covered!




Table! II! presents!bivariate!DID!estimations!of!performance!of! supported!and!non>supported!banks!
over! two! time>periods:! the! year! of! intervention,! and! the! five! consecutive! years! following! the!
intervention.!The!results!are!grouped!by!intervention!measure.!!
[Table!II]!
In!general,!we! find!statistically! significant!differences! in!performance!between!supported!and!non>
supported! institutions! after! the! intervention! period.! At! the! time! of! intervention,! there! are! no!
observed!differences!between! these! two!banking!groups.!This! is!not! surprising,!given! the! systemic!
nature!of! such!crises,!which!normally!affect! the!entire!banking! sector.! This!evidence!also! confirms!
recent!studies!suggesting! that! it! is!very!difficult! for!policymakers! to!distinguish!between!distressed!
and!non>distressed! institutions! (Freixas!and!Parigi,!2008).! Interestingly,! the!results!suggest! that!the!
gap! in! the! banks’! financial! performance! increases! as! the! crises! continues.! As! our! results! show,!










programs! involving!AMCs.!More!specifically,! the!results!suggest!that! institutions!supported!by!such!
measures!have! lower!z>scores,! lower!capital! ratios,! lower! liquidity! ratios,!and! larger!proportions!of!
impaired! loans! among! their! assets! following! interventions! (specification! I,! III,! V).! This! result!might!
suggest!that!banks!that!receive!aid!tend!to!engage!in!more!risky!projects!than!control!group!banks.!In!
addition,! the! results! suggest! that! supported! institutions! become! less! efficient! than! their! non>
supported!competitors!following!intervention.!These!results!appear!to!support!the!literature,!which!
argues! that! politically! dominated! instruments! decrease! the! efficiency! of! banks! due! to! lower!
governance!standards!and!lack!of!a!proper!restructuring!process,!resulting!from!a!policy!of!restraint!




only! exception! is! nationalization,! where! the! activity! of! nationalized! banks! significantly! decreases!
compared!to!both!the!intervention!period!and!other!banks.!This!finding!might!suggest!that!political!
involvement!hampers!banking!sector!recovery,!a!result!that! is!consistent!with!the! literature!on!the!
state>ownership! of! banks,! which! suggests! that! politicians! might! use! banks! to! pursue! their! own!
interests!(Shleifer!and!Vishny,!1994;!Iannotta!et!al.,!2007).!!
Our! evidence! suggests! that! liquidity! provisions! tend! to! improve! banks’! financial! indicators!




intervention! period.! This! evidence! suggests! that! liquidity! provision! might! be! an! effective! way! to!
improve! banks’! financial! ratios,! in! agreement! with! studies! documenting! that! liquidity! provision!
improves! banks’! liquidity,! giving! banks! access! to! additional! capital! (Hakenes! and! Schnabel,! 2010).!
Improved!performance!in!the!supported!banks!following!government>assisted!merger!transactions!is!













results.! The! first! column! lists! the! general! determinants! of! government! support.! However,! the!
additional!estimations!refer!to!the!determinants!of!the!use!of!specific!policy!instruments!defined!as:!
blanket! guarantee,! liquidity! provision,! government>assisted! merger,! nationalization,! and! AMC,!
respectively.!!
[Table!III]!
The! regression! results! in! the! first! column!present! important! implications.! Specifically,! they! suggest!





by!Faccio!et!al.! (2006),!who!show!that!while!bailouts!go! to!politically! connected! firms,! these! firms!
exhibit!significantly!worse!financial!performance!than!their!non>connected!peers!at!the!time!of!and!
following!the!bailout.!Thus,! the!authors!conclude!that,! for!some!countries,! the!allocation!of!capital!
through!connected!firms!may!alleviate!distressed!economies.!!




central! bank! funding! (specification! (2)! and! (3)).! The! result! is! promising,! as! the! purpose! of! such!
measures! is! to! restore! banking! sector! confidence! by! improving! the! sector’s! liquidity.! Thus,! such! a!
result!justifies!regulatory!actions.!!
The! findings! for! restructuring!programs! suggest! that! banks!with!balance>sheet!problems!are!more!
likely!to!receive!capital!support.!The!equity!coefficient!on!nationalization!is!negative!and!statistically!
significant! (specification! (4)).!Again,! the! results! justify! the!use!of! these!measures! in!cases!of!highly!
distressed! banks.! Additionally,! the! regression! results! suggest! that! less! profitable! banks! are! more!
likely!than!others!to!be!nationalized,!suggesting!that!nationalization!is!used!as!a!last!resort!for!banks!
in! deep! financial! and! capital! distress.!We! expected! that! government>assisted!mergers! were!more!
likely! to!be!used! in! countries! less! affected!by! the! financial! crisis,! or! in! the! initial! stages!of! a! crisis.!
Accordingly,!we!observe!a!positive!sign!for!the!GDP!growth!coefficient.!Finally,!the!data!suggest!that!
the! use! of! the! restructuring! programs! is! reserved! for! larger! banks.! However,! we! do! not! observe!
significant! coefficients! for! other! measures! taken! to! support! banks.! The! results! may! indicate! that!
objective!criteria!do!not!always!drive!the!decision!to!assign!a!bank!to!a!restructuring!program.!This!





The! aim! of! government! interventions! is! to! ensure! that! banks! survive! and! operate! competitively,!
which!requires!improvements!in!banks’!liquidity,!capital,!and!profitability!ratios.!The!empirical!results!
from!this!study!have!shown!that!bailout!measures!target!distressed!banks,!and!that!the!appropriate!
types! of! policy! instruments! were! employed! to! address! banks’! specific! problems.! This! section!
investigates!whether!these!measures!assist!distressed!banks!recover!from!their!distressed!positions.!!
5.1. Probability!of!recovery,!given!government!intervention!instruments!!
We! first! assess! the! effectiveness! of! intervention! mechanisms! by! estimating! the! probit! model! to!
evaluate!the!likelihood!that!a!bank!that!receives!government!support!survives!over!the!following!five!
years,! and! thus! recovers! from! distress.! This! type! of! analysis! provides! a! first! impression! of! the!
effectiveness!of! intervention!measures.!We! run! the! regression!on! the! sample!of! supported!banks,!
assigning! a! dummy! variable! with! a! value! of! one! to! a! bank! that! fails! within! five! years! following!
government!intervention,!and!zero!to!a!bank!that!survives.!Hence,!a!positive!coefficient! indicates!a!





The! estimation! results! have! interesting! implications.! In! general,! the! estimation! results! show! that!
government! intervention! increases! the! probability! of! a! bank’s! failure,! a! result! that! is! highly!
statistically!significant.! In!addition,!the!magnitude!of!the!effect! is! large.! In!the!previous!section,!we!
showed!that!government!support!goes!to!the!banks!most!in!need.!Therefore,!we!would!expect!that!





improve! the!banks’! conditions,! or! the! intervention! is! poorly! implemented.! Findings!with! regard! to!
specific!bailout!measures!present!a!more!detailed!picture.!!
Liquidity! provisions! and! government>assisted!mergers! are! positively! correlated!with! bankruptcy! in!






Blanket! guarantees! and! nationalizations! are! positively! related! to! bank! survival! following! an!
intervention,! with! both! coefficients! highly! significant! and! negative.! There! might! be! several!
explanations!for!this.!First,!both!public!guarantees!and!nationalization!offer!government!protection!
against!bankruptcy.!Second,!it!is!relatively!more!likely!that!such!banks!will!receive!additional!support!
if! the!crisis! continues!and! their! situation!deteriorates.!This!also!explains!why! these!measures!have!
correlate!with!banks’!risk>taking!behavior!(Dam!and!Koetter,!2012;!Hryckiewicz,!2014).!The!results!do!
not!show!a!significant!effect!of!AMC!on!the!probability!of!bank!failure.!This!result!is!consistent!with!
the! findings! of! Klingebiel! (2000),! who! shows! that! the! effectiveness! of! this! measure! is! mixed! and!
mainly!depends!on!the!institutional!mechanisms!of!a!country.!!
Coefficients! for! other! financial! variables! are! largely! consistent! with! the! existing! literature.! Higher!
profitability!and!bank!capital!decreases!the!probability!of!failure.!The!results!also!suggest!that!larger!
institutions!tend!to!collapse! less! frequently! than!smaller!ones.!This! result!could!be!expected,!given!
the! various! measures! and! public! protection! targeting! large! institutions! due! to! their! systemic!
importance! (Brown! and! Dinc,! 2009).! Finally,! the! results! show! that! probability! of! bank! failure!






























will! allow! us! to! evaluate! the! effectiveness! of! various! bailout! programs,! where! we! allow! for! the!
simultaneous! implementation! of! several! policy! measures! for! one! bank.! We! can! then! test! our!
hypotheses! regarding! the! importance! of! scale! and! structure! of! government! interventions! in!
determining! the! effectiveness! of! intervention! instruments.! Table! V! presents! the! results! of! our!
analysis,! grouped! by! intervention! policy! measures,! for! the! following! performance! measures:!
(log)zscore,!equity!ratio,!and!liquidity!ratio,!respectively.1!
[Table!V]!
The! estimation! results! present! several! interesting! findings.! First,! they! show! that,! in! general,!
supported! banks’! performance! deteriorated! in! the! period! following! intervention! compared! to! the!
intervention! period.! It! is! possible! that! intervention!measures!were!unable! to! significantly! improve!
bank! performance.! By! contrast,! non>supported! bank! performance! improved! or! just! slightly!
deteriorated!during!the!same!sample!period.!This!result!is!consistent!with!the!literature!presented!by!
opponents! of! government! intervention,! suggesting! that! government! actions! are! ineffective! in!
restoring!long>term!banking!sector!stability!(di!Patti!and!Kashyap,!2010).!!
More! importantly,! the! results! document! that! differences! in! performance! between! supported! and!












However,!we!observe!heterogeneity! in! our! results,! depending!on! the! intervention! instrument! and!
the! bank! performance! measure! used.! The! largest! performance! decreases! occurred! among! banks!
offered!blanket!guarantees,!were!nationalized,!or!used!an!AMC!as!a!debt!restructuring!mechanism.!
These! results! are! also! in! line!with!our! summary! statistics.! For! all!measures,!we!observe! that! bank!
performance!deteriorated!relative!to!both!the!intervention!period!and!to!competitors.!These!findings!
are! independent! of! the! bank! performance!measure! used.! However,! for! non>supported! banks,! we!
observe! only! a! slight! decrease! in! performance! compared! with! the! intervention! period,! and!
significantly!smaller!than!that!for!supported!banks.!!
The! results! have! several! important! implications.! First,! they! suggest! that! blanket! guarantees! are!
ineffective! in! providing! liquidity! for! banks! that! already! have! liquidity! problems.! Accordingly,! the!
evidence! suggests! that! blanket! guarantees! do! not! effectively! restore! confidence! during! a! liquidity!
crisis.!This!finding!is!consistent!with!evidence!provided!by!Honohan!and!Klingebiel!(2003)!and!Kane!
and! Klingebiel! (2004),!who! show! that! blanket! guarantees! are! only! effective! if! they! are! credible,! a!
condition! that! is! difficult! to! fulfill! during! systemic! banking! crises.! Similarly,! Schnabel! (2004)! shows!
that! only! a! combination! of! blanket! guarantees! and! significant! liquidity! provision! can! restore! the!
liquidity! of! distressed! banks.! Additionally,! our! results! regarding! liquidity! provisions! show! that! this!
measure! is! effective! in! improving! banks’! performance.! In! particular,! we! do! not! observe! any!
significant! deterioration! in! the! ratios! used! here! to!measure! performance! among! supported! banks!
following! this! type!of! intervention.!We! find!an! improvement! in! the! capital! ratio! following! liquidity!
injections! when! that! ratio! is! used! as! our! endogenous! variable.! This! most! likely! suggests! that!







Second,! we! observe! that! the! z>score! and! liquidity! ratios! significantly! decreased! for! nationalized!
banks,! compared! with! the! initial! period,! whereas! the! capital! ratio! slightly! increased! for! these!
institutions.! These! results! might! indicate! that,! despite! increases! in! the! capital! ratio,! pure! capital!
injections!cannot!restore!a!bank’s!balance!sheet.!Deep!restructuring!is!required!to!clean!up!a!bank’s!
toxic!assets!and!restore!its!long>term!sustainability!(House!and!Masatlioglu,!2010;!Bhattacharya!and!
Nyborg,! 2010).! Importantly,! this! also! explains! the! ineffectiveness! of! the! AMC! intervention!
instrument.! Politicians’! reluctance! to! undertake! restructuring! often! renders! these! measures!





Generally,! we! have! shown! that! supported! banks! underperformed! relative! to! their! non>supported!
counterparts,!as!well!as!to!their!own!performance!at!the!time!of!intervention!period,!controlling!for!
country>specific! economic! conditions.! These! results! imply! that! government! interventions! are!
ineffective!in!restoring!banking!sector!stability.!In!this!section,!we!examine!how!the!effectiveness!of!











following! structures:! 1)! guarantees! with! liquidity! provisions,! 2)! nationalization! with! the! use! of! an!
AMC,! 3)! government>assisted!mergers!with! the!use!of! an!AMC,! 4)! guarantees!with!nationalization!
and! use! of! an! AMC,! 5)! liquidity! provisions! with! nationalization,! and! 6)! liquidity! provisions! and!
government>assisted!mergers!with!the!use!of!an!AMC.!We!then!compare!the!financial!performance!
of!banks!supported!by!a!single!policy!measure!(PART!I)!and!by!a!combination!of! instruments!(PART!
II),! in! both! cases! relative! to! banks! supported! by! other! measures.! Table! VI! presents! the! results,!
grouped! into! two! parts:! banks! supported! by! a! single! policy! measure! and! banks! supported! by! a!
combination!of!different!measures.!!
[Table!VI]!
The! first! part! of! the! analysis! demonstrates! that! the! financial! performance! of! almost! all! supported!
banks! deteriorated! relative! to! the! initial! period.! However,! the! regression! results! also! show! that,!
under! a! given! specific! intervention! program,! this! drop! was! less! significant.! This! finding! suggests!
distinctive!degrees!of!effectiveness!of!various!intervention!measures.!We!find!that!the!greatest!drops!
in!performance!occurred!in!banks!that!were!offered!blanket!guarantees,!nationalized,!and!employed!
the! AMC! strategy.! We! also! find! that! differences! in! the! financial! performance! of! these! banks,!








performance! (except! in! cases!of! government>assisted!mergers)! relative! to! the! intervention!period.!






This! result! suggests! two! important!conclusions.!Given!a!significant! scale!of! intervention,! it!appears!
that!the!scale!of!government!support!affects!a!bank’s!recovery.!It!also!appears!that!the!design!of!a!
bailout! program! plays! a! role! in! facilitating! a! bank’s! recovery.! We! show! that! liquidity! provisions!
accompanied! by! appropriate! resolution!mechanisms! are! the!most! effective! policy! combination! in!
achieving! banking! sector! recovery.! This! conclusion! is! consistent! with! studies! that! find! that! pure!
capital! injections! are! insufficient! to! restore! banking! sector! stability.! Restructuring!mechanisms! are!
therefore! needed,! a! conclusion! in! line!with! the! evidence! from!House! and!Masatlioglu! (2010)! and!
Bhattacharya! and! Nyborg! (2010).! In! addition,! our! results! suggest! the! ineffectiveness! of! politically!
dominated!intervention!instruments!in!restoring!banking!sector!stability,!in!accordance!with!findings!
from!Berger!and!Bouwman!(2009),!Gropp!et!al.!(2011),!and!Dam!and!Koetter!(2012).!!
5.2.3. Impact! of! a! country’s! institutional! environment! on! the! effectiveness! of! regulatory!
intervention!measures!
As!shown!previously,!the!scale!and!design!of!a!bailout!program!influences!its!effectiveness.!Existing!
theory!also! suggests! that!appropriate! institutional! infrastructure!may!enhance! the!effectiveness!of!
intervention.! Sweden! is! an! example! where! strong! regulatory! mechanisms! and! limited! state!
partnership! in! banking! sector! restructuring! led! to! the! success! of! most! of! the! policy! actions!
implemented.!!
To! analyze! which! regulatory! measures! should! work! best,! given! a! country’s! institutional!
infrastructure,!we!again!employ!a!DID!approach.!However,!we!now!differentiate!banks!according!to!






performance!of!banks! supported!by!a! specific!policy!measure!but! located! in! countries!with! strong!
regulatory! environments! with! banks! supported! by! the! same! measure! but! located! in! less!
institutionally!developed!countries.!We!expect!that!strong!institutional!infrastructure!facilitates!bank!
recovery.! Table! VII! presents! results! examining! the! following! institutional! mechanisms:! explicit!
deposit!state!guarantees,!strength!of!capital!requirements,!and!power!of!supervisory!authorities.!!
![Table!VII]!
In! general,! the! results! show! that,! at! the! time! of! intervention,! banks! in! countries! with! stronger!
institutional!environments!exhibit!better!financial!ratios!than!their!counterparties!in!less!developed!
countries.!This!is!seen!in!the!coefficients!for!almost!all!banks!that!receive!support.!Interestingly,!the!
evidence! shows! that! this! situation! changes! following! regulatory! intervention.! The! performance! of!
supported! banks! in! countries! with! highly! developed! institutional! infrastructure! deteriorates! more!
than! in! countries! with! less! developed! institutional! environments.! This! result! holds! for! almost! all!
intervention! measures! and! is! most! significant! for! such! politically! dominated! measures! as!
nationalization! and! use! of! an! AMC.! This! result! appears! to! suggest! that,! in! countries! with! strong!






stability.! In!our!paper,!we!test! four! important!questions.!First,!does!government!support!go! to! the!
institutions!that!need!it!most?!Second,!do!the!regulatory!measures!employed!address!banks’!specific!
problems?!Third,!how!effective!are!government!interventions!in!enhancing!banking!sector!stability?!
Finally,!how! is! the!effectiveness!of! government! intervention! influenced!by!a! country’s! institutional!
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environment?! The! regression! results! demonstrate! that! weak! banks! are! most! likely! to! receive!
government! support! and! that! the! type! of! support! extended! addresses! banks’! specific! problems.!
However,! our! results! indicate! that! supported! banks! are! weaker! than! their! non>supported!
counterparts.!We!attribute!this!to!the!insufficient!scale!of!liquidity!provisions!and!the!ineffectiveness!
of! regulators! in! implementing! the! necessary! restructuring.! We! also! find! that! strengthening! the!
market! disciplining! mechanisms! in! the! post>crisis! period! may! enhance! the! effectiveness! of!
intervention!measures.!!
The! results!offer! several! contributions! to! the!existing! literature.!We! find! that! government! support!
goes! to! banks! with! relatively! weak! financial! performance,! in! accordance! with! the! theoretical!
literature! arguing! that! government! interventions! are! justified! because! they! allow! distressed!
institutions! to! recover! from! crisis,! helping! to! stabilize! the! banking! sector! (Bagehot,! 1873;! Acharya!
and! Yorulmazer,! 2006;! Berger! and! Bouwman,! 2009;! Hakenes! and! Schnabel,! 2010).! Our! regression!
analysis!also!shows!that!less!liquid!banks!are!likely!to!receive!liquidity!support,!and!undercapitalized!
banks!are!likely!to!receive!capital!support.!In!this!respect,!our!study!contributes!to!the!literature!on!
the! determinants! of! bank! bailouts! by! rejecting! the! hypothesis! that! government! interventions! are!
ineffective!because!they!do!not!address!banks’!actual!problems.!!
However,! although! government! support! goes! to! the! right! banks,! and! that! the! types! of! injections!
employed! address! banks’! problems,! the! third! part! of! our! analysis! suggests! that! government!
interventions!are!ineffective!in!restoring!banking!sector!stability.!Our!analysis!shows!that!the!z>score,!
a!measure!of!distance!of!a!bank!from!bankruptcy,!deteriorates!more!significantly!among!institutions!
that! receive! assistance! than! among! institutions! that! do! not! receive! assistance,! controlling! for! a!
country’s!economic!conditions.!We!argue!that!this!is!because!of!a!lack!of!necessary!restructuring!in!
the! institutions! that! received!assistance,!a! finding! in! line!with! the! literature!advocating!mandatory!
bank!bail>ins!before!the! implementation!of!bailout!mechanisms!(see!for!example!Financial!Stability!




away! from! insolvency! risk.!Finally,!we! find! that!appropriate! institutional!mechanisms!may!enhance!
the!effectiveness!of!some!of!regulatory!measures.!!
Our! results! have! important! policy! implications.! First,! they! show! that! the! design! and! scale! of! an!
intervention! program! determines! its! success! in! facilitating! banking! sector! recovery.! Our! results!
demonstrate! that! liquidity! provision! accompanied! by! a! strategy! of! bank! resolution! significantly!
improves! a! bank’s! financial! condition.! Second,! we! find! that! the! implementation! of! intervention!
measures!is!crucial!to!the!effectiveness!of!government!intervention.!A!deep!restructuring!process!is!
required! for! banks! to! recover! from!distress,! as! pure! liquidity! provisions! are! not! sufficient! to! avert!
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Argentina 2001 1 6 8 0 7 2 1 3 
Bulgaria 1996 0 7 2 0 1 2 0 2 
Colombia 1998 2 4 9 0 5 2 5 2 
Croatia 1998 1 8 6 0 0 4 3 4 
Czech 
Republic 1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Ecuador 1998 0 8 2 2 1 0 0 2 
Estonia 1992 0 2 4 0 2 1 3 3 
Finland 1991 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Indonesia 1997 2 1 12 11 5 10 1 8 
Jamaica 1996 0 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Japan 1997 2 4 13 11 0 2 8 9 
Korea 1997 0 7 6 3 1 2 4 2 
Lithuania 1995 0 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 
Malaysia 1997 5 8 7 3 2 1 4 2 
Mexico 1994 1 3 5 4 3 1 3 2 
Nicaragua 2000 3 4 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Norway 1991 0 5 7 7 6 2 0 4 
Paraguay 1995 0 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Russia 1998 0 6 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Sweden 1991 0 4 3 2 1 0 2 1 
Thailand 1997 2 5 5 5 2 3 1 3 
Turkey 2000 0 5 8 3 4 1 6 4 
Ukraine 1998 0 6 2 0 2 0 0 2 
Uruguay 2002 4 6 2 0 2 2 0 1 
Venezuela 1994 1 4 2 0 1 1 0 1 

































government! intervention.! The!DID!estimates! are!presented! in! the! last! column.! The! robust! standard!errors! are! clustered!at! the! country!
level.!***,**,!and!*!denote!significance!at!the!1%,!5%,!and!10%!levels,!respectively.!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!At!the!intervention!! After!intervention!
Intervention!measure!!!!!!!!!!!!NonKintervened! Intervened! Difference! NonKintervened! Intervened! Difference! DiffKinKdiff!
BLANKET!GUARANTEES!(I)! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Activity! 51.828! 65.541! 13.713**! 46.696! 51.876! 5.179! K8.534!
!
(4.401)! !(4.637)! !(5.548)! !(2.467)! !(6.666)! (5.981)! !(6.262)!
Size! 6.693! 8.373! 1.680**! 6.955! 8.637! 1.682**! 0.001!
!
!(0.316)! !(0.823)! !(0.786)! !(0.356)! (0.755)! (0.644)! (0.232)!
Zscore! 22.298! 38.810! 16.512! 25.192! 5.831! K19.361***! K35.873!
! (15.578)! (19.116)! (27.517)! (6.735)! (1.820)! (6.857)! (29.155)!
(Log)zscore! 1.822! 4.062! 2.240**! 2.219! 1.110! K1.109***! K3.349***!
!
(0.890)! (0.000)! (0.890)! (0.182)! (0.395)! (0.389)! (1.179)!
Equity! 8.772! 5.062! K3.711! 12.054! >1.270! K13.324***! K9.614!
!
(3.459)! (1.007)! (3.572)! (1.059)! (3.574)! (3.653)! (5.633)!
!        Loss!Reserves! 12.132! 18.722! 6.590! 11.013! 15.242! 4.229! K2.362!
!
(3.579)! (14.843)! (14.991)! (2.211)! (4.505)! (4.571)! (11.965)!
Liquidity! 38.527! 19.601! K18.926***! 39.042! 22.174! K16.868***! 2.058!
!
(6.484)! (3.179)! (6.420)! (4.441)! (4.038)! (5.237)! (3.548)!
!        Profitability!(ROA)! >1.814! >0.998! 0.815! 0.953! >5.276! K6.229**! K7.045!
!
(2.739)! (0.802)! (2.820)! (0.342)! (2.834)! (2.869)! (4.178)!
Efficiency! 77.184! 77.315! 0.131! 73.036! 89.036! 15.999*! 15.869!
!
(8.609)! (8.735)! (10.518)! (4.321)! (8.161)! (8.076)! (11.775)!
LIQUDITY!PROVISIONS!(II)! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Activity! 54.732! 59.338! 4.606! 47.664! 49.223! 1.559! K3.047!
! (3.538)! (5.430)! (3.558)! (2.415)! (5.766)! (4.406)! (2.902)!
Size! 7.188! 7.387! 0.199! 7.349! 7.574! 0.225! 0.026!
! (0.597)! (0.443)! (0.664)! (0.561)! (0.424)! (0.611)! (0.230)!
Zscore! 43.052! 23.903! K19.149! 23.374! 10.525! K12.848! 6.300!
! (22.807)! (11.603)! (25.588)! (6.631)! (2.550)! (7.510)! (26.516)!
!
(Log)Zscore! 3.377! 2.165! K1.213! 2.080! 1.586! K0.495**! 0.718!
! (0.676)! (0.471)! (0.824)! (0.186)! (0.259)! (0.219)! (0.897)!
Equity! 11.134! 1.497! K9.638*! 9.987! 4.512! K5.475***! 4.163!
! (1.813)! (5.030)! (5.099)! (1.740)! (2.173)! (1.750)! (5.302)!
Loss!Reserves! 7.827! 24.638! 16.811! 9.447! 19.365! 9.918*! K6.893!
! (2.130)! (14.137)! (14.216)! (1.500)! (5.921)! (5.731)! (10.043)!
Liquidity! 38.822! 20.968! K17.855***! 38.134! 25.228! K12.905***! 4.949!
! (6.351)! (3.226)! (6.060)! (4.437)! (3.459)! (4.169)! (4.088)!
Profitability!(ROA)! 0.525! >4.962! K5.487! >0.004! >2.678! K2.674! 2.812!
! (1.310)! (4.082)! (4.242)! (0.738)! (2.020)! (1.839)! (4.789)!
Efficiency! 73.058! 84.738! 11.679! 73.981! 85.289! 11.308! K0.372!
! (7.841)! (11.147)! (11.907)! (4.376)! (6.450)! (6.914)! (13.569)!
!
NATIONALIZATION!(III)! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Activity! 56.702! 55.643! K1.059! 50.218! 39.683!!!! !!K10.535***! K9.475!
! (3.668)! (7.024)! (5.634)! (2.779)! (4.034)! (2.933)! (6.282)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Size! 7.146! 7.653!!!! !!!0.506! 7.361! 7.608! 0.247! K0.259!
! (0.480)! (0.550)! (0.556)! (0.508)! (0.431)! (0.507)! (0.192)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Zscore! 28.942! 29.699!!!!! !0.757! 23.045! 7.329! K15.716**! K16.473!
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! (19.233)! (18.130)! (31.355)! (6.002)! (3.300)! (6.546)! (33.497)!
(Log)zscore! 2.143! 2.995!!!!!!! 0.853! 2.132! 1.111! K1.022**! K1.874!
! (1.125)! (1.029)! (1.884)! (0.164)! (0.504)! (0.482)! (2.288)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Equity! 8.250! 5.051! K3.198! 10.078! 2.096!!!!!! !K7.982*! K4.783!
! (3.050)! (0.847)! (3.045)! (1.356)! (4.214)! (4.080)! (5.466)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Loss!Reserves! 10.642! 26.217! 15.574! 10.456! 18.918!!!! !!8.462! K7.112!
! (3.191)! (21.486)! (21.444)! (2.079)! (5.099)! (5.186)! (17.234)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Liquidity! 32.698! 30.306! K2.392! 34.857! 32.339!!!!!! K2.518! K0.125!
! (5.390)! (4.373)! (4.927)! (4.253)! (4.586)! (4.580)! (3.569)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Profitability!(ROA)! >1.991! >0.021! 1.970! >0.070! >3.400!! K3.330!! K5.300!
! (2.306)! (0.898)! (2.292)! (0.645)! (2.824)! (2.768)! (3.537)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Efficiency! 76.096! 80.946! 4.850! 73.760! !91.125! !17.366**!!! 12.516!
! (7.408)! (10.588)! (10.069)! (4.655)! (6.159)! (7.587)! (11.078)!
MERGER!(IV)! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Activity! 55.152! 60.333! 5.181! 47.320! 50.791!!!!! !3.472! K1.710!
! (4.636)! (3.848)! (4.629)! (3.303)! (4.473)! (4.684)! (3.218)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Size! 6.863! 8.435! 1.572**! 7.068! 8.624!!!!!! !1.556**! K0.016!
! (0.333)! (0.836)! (0.702)! (0.373)! (0.763)! (0.589)! (0.275)!
Zscore! 34.150! 0.721! K33.429**! 21.721! 12.944!!!! !!K8.778! 24.651!
! (14.034)! (0.000)! (14.034)! (6.144)! (1.960)! (6.639)! (15.800)!
(Log)zscore! 3.148! >0.327! K3.475***! 1.940! 1.989!!!!!!! 0.049! 3.524***!
! (0.660)! .! (0.660)! (0.209)! (0.154)! (0.166)! (0.671)!
Equity! 8.033! 5.991!!!!!!! K2.042! 8.870! 7.241! K1.628! 0.413!
! (3.119)! (1.001)! (3.150)! (2.019)! (1.010)! (1.869)! (3.659)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Loss!Reserves! 17.767! 5.442! K12.325! 13.248! 8.530!!!!!!! K4.718*! 7.607!
! (7.762)! (0.909)! (7.704)! (2.549)! (1.350)! (2.290)! (6.003)!
Liquidity! 33.866! 27.007! K6.859! 36.437! 27.061!!!!!! K9.377*! K2.518!
! (5.881)! (4.388)! (6.764)! (4.445)! (4.133)! (5.301)! (4.010)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Profitability!(ROA)! >1.725! >0.985! 0.740! >0.842! !>0.322!! 0.520!! K0.220!
! (2.429)! (0.677)! (2.432)! (1.046)! (0.559)! (0.771)! (2.531)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Efficiency! 77.949! 75.178! K2.771! 79.252! 68.927!!!!!! K10.325*! K7.554!
! (7.583)! (9.427)! (9.224)! (4.544)! (3.608)! (5.028)! (9.902)!
AMC!(V)! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Activity! 55.208! 59.045! 3.838! 49.139! 45.470!!!! !!K3.669! K7.506!
! (3.892)! (5.066)! (3.658)! (2.741)! (5.290)! (4.464)! (4.922)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Size! 6.689! 8.475! 1.786***! 7.013! 8.418!!!!!!! 1.405***! K0.381!
! (0.374)! (0.676)! (0.608)! (0.405)! (0.625)! (0.477)! (0.232)!
Zscore! 43.052! 23.903! K19.149! 24.352! 8.306!!!!!!! K16.045**! 3.103!
! (22.807)! (11.603)! (25.588)! (6.429)! (2.615)! (6.809)! (27.167)!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
(Log)zscore! 3.377! 2.165! K1.213! 2.181! 1.289!!!!! !!K0.892**! 0.321!
! (0.676)! (0.471)! (0.824)! (0.173)! (0.345)! (0.327)! (1.011)!
Equity! 8.591! 5.236! K3.355! 10.695! 2.893!!!!! !!K7.802***! K4.447!
! (3.416)! (0.589)! (3.322)! (1.494)! (2.319)! (1.891)! (4.086)!
Loss!Reserves! 84.768! 69.763! K15.005! 100.295! 103.468!! !!!3.173! 18.177!
! (16.173)! (9.951)! (14.076)! (9.910)! (13.847)! (15.204)! (19.021)!
Liquidity! 34.775! 26.674! K8.101! 36.855! 28.455!! !!!!K8.399**! K0.299!
! (5.934)! (4.442)! (6.105)! (4.173)! (4.161)! (3.534)! (4.082)!
Profitability!(ROA)! >2.178! >0.183!! 1.995!! 0.295! >3.345! K3.640**! K5.636!
! (2.621)! (0.605)! (2.536)! (0.518)! (1.938)! (1.571)! (2.963)!
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Efficiency! 77.316! 77.060! K0.256! 73.067! 87.312!!!! !!14.244**! 14.500!


























& Logit& Probit& Logit& Probit& Logit& Probit& Logit& Probit& Logit& Probit& Logit& Probit&
Profit.$t;1$ 0.036$ 0.023$ 0.127*$ 0.073*$ 0.018$ 0.011$ ;0.139*$ ;0.077**$ 0.040$ 0.020$ ;0.039$ ;0.022$
(0.065)$ (0.041)$ (0.074)$ (0.043)$ (0.059)$ (0.036)$ (0.073)$ (0.039)$ (0.076)$ (0.044)$ (0.074)$ (0.041)$
            
Equity$t;1$ ;0.074**$ ;0.043**$ ;0.072$ ;0.044$ ;0.055$ ;0.035$ $$;0.125*$ ;0.075*$ ;0.026$$ ;0.014$ ;0.069$ ;0.044$
(0.032)$ (0.018)$ (0.054)$ (0.031)$ (0.041)$ (0.024)$ (0.070)$ (0.040)$ (0.034)$$$ (0.018)$ (0.056)$ (0.030)$$$$
    $        Liquidity$t;1$ ;0.015$ ;0.009*$ ;0.054***$ ;0.031***$ ;0.036***$$
(0.013)$
;0.021***.$ 0.013$ 0.007$ 0.008$ 0.005$ 0.001$ 0.000$
(0.010)$ (0.006)$ (0.020)$ (0.010)$ (0.007)$ (0.016)$ (0.009)$ (0.015)$ (0.008)$$$ (0.017)$ (0.009)$
  $  $       Efficiency$t;1$ ;0.001$ ;0.000$ .0051085$ 0.003$ ;0.004$ ;0.002$ 0.002$ 0.001$ ;0.003$ ;0.002$ ;0.002$ ;0.001$
(0.003)$ (0.002)$ .0038947$ (0.002)$ (0.005)$ (0.003)$ (0.006)$ (0.003)$ (0.005)$ (0.003)$ (0.003)$ (0.002)$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $Size$t;1$ 0.365**$ 0.220***$ 0.451***$ 0.259***$ 0.021$ 0.012$ 0.114$ 0.066$ 0.426***$ 0.253***$ 0.429***$ 0.257***$
(0.117)$ (0.069)$ (0.155)$ (0.082)$ (0.149)$ (0.090)$ (0.172)$ $$$$$(0.112)$ (0.109)$ (0.062)$ (0.134)$ (0.077)$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $GDP$ 0.043$ 0.024$ 0.116$ 0.071$ ;0.007$ ;0.004$ 0.078$ 0.045$ 0.140***$ 0.082***$ 0.077$ 0.046$
growth$$ (0.052)$ (0.031)$ (0.077)$ (0.044)$ (0.054)$ (0.032)$ (0.054)$ (0.033)$ (0.041)$ (0.023)$ (0.054)$ (0.031)$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $CPI$$ 0.611*$ 0.344*$ ;0.201$ ;0.119$ 0.493$ $$0.302$ 0.490$ 0.280$ 0.418$ 0.255$ 0.604*$ 0.362*$
$ (0.366)$ (0.204)$$ (0.495)$ (0.263)$ (0.340)$ (0.202)$ (0.319)$ (0.201)$ (0.304)$ (0.169)$ (0.362)$ (0.206)$
Concen.$ 0.013$ 0.008$ 0.040*$ $$0.022**$ 0.018**$ 0.011**$ 0.004$ 0.002$ ;0.005$ ;0.003$ 0.021*$ 0.013*$
$ (0.013)$ (0.007)$$ (0.022)$ (0.011)$ (0.009)$ (0.005)$ (0.010)$ (0.006)$ (0.017)$ (0.010)$ (0.012)$ (0.007)$
Constant$ ;3.224**$ ;1.893**$ ;5.281**$ ;2.983***$ ;1.060$ ;0.651$ ;2.551$ ;1.453$ ;5.498***$ ;3.233***$ ;5.727***$ ;3.397***$
$ (1.476)$ (0.875)$ (2.171)$ (1.111)$ (1.605)$ (0.954)$ (1.858)$ (1.204)$ (1.179)$ $(0.659)$ (1.874)$ (1.027)$
R2& 0.162& 0.162& 0.343& 0.346& 0.126& 0.126& 0.121& 0.124& 0.151& 0.154& 0.170& 0.173&














Dummy& Guarantee& Liquidity& Nationalization& Merger& AMC&
Intervention$Dummy$ 2.147***$ =2.519**$ 1.818**$ =1.758**$ 1.704***$ 0.301$
$
(0.665)$ (1.031)$ (0.707)$ (0.893)$ (0.553)$ (0.439)$
Profitab.(ROA)$ =0.134*$ =0.108$ =0.107$ =0.058$ =0.051$ =0.092$
$
(0.081)$ (0.099)$ (0.103)$ (0.072)$ (0.052)$ (0.075)$
Equity$ =0.166***$ =0.142**$ =0.081**$ =0.146***$ =0.141***$ =0.116***$
$
(0.037)$ (0.069)$ (0.032)$ (0.039)$ (0.041)$ (0.036)$
Liquidity$ =0.019$ =0.035*$ =0.006$ =0.009$ =0.020$ =0.015$
$
(0.017)$ (0.019)$ (0.015)$ (0.016)$ (0.019)$ (0.016)$
Efficiency$ 0.003$ 0.007***$ 0.009***$ 0.008***$ 0.008***$ 0.005*$
$
(0.003)$ (0.003)$ (0.003)$ (0.003)$ (0.003)$ (0.003)$
Size$ =0.537***$ =0.345***$ =0.482***$ =0.471**$ =0.649***$ =0.523***$
$
(0.139)$ (0.142)$ (0.147)$ (0.194)$ (0.196)$ (0.124)$
Gdpgrowth$ =0.101$ =0.097$ =0.114$ =0.018$ =0.099$ =0.115$
$
(0.073)$ (0.078)$ (0.074)$ (0.071)$ (0.074)$ (0.071)$
CPI$ 0.054$ =0.059$ =0.257$ 0.052$ 0.011$ 0.044$
$
(0.184)$ (0.245)$ (0.249)$ (0.226)$ (0.258)$ (0.190)$
Concen.$ =0.052***$ =0.082***$ =0.090***$ =0.075***$ =0.098***$ =0.085***$
$
(0.012)$ (0.029)$ (0.017)$ (0.021)$ (0.026)$ (0.021)$
Constant$ 6.749***$ 9.641***$ 8.060***$ 8.326***$ 10.152***$ 9.319***$
$$ (2.502)$ (2.454)$ (2.290)$ (2.994)$ (2.909)$ (2.255)$
R2& 0.281& 0.284& 0.409& 0.397& 0.385& 0.285&

















The$ table$presents$difference=in=differences$ (DID)$estimations$of$bank$performance:$ (log)zscore,$equity,$ and$ liquidity$ ratio,$ respectively.$
Banks$ are$ grouped$ into$ banks$ that$ received$ support,$ depending$ on$ the$ policy$ employed$ (blanket$ guarantee,$ liquidity$ provisions,$
nationalization,$and$use$of$an$AMC),$and$non=supported.$The$estimates$show$differences$in$bank$performance$at$the$time$of$intervention$
and$over$the$next$five$years$following$government$intervention.$The$DID$estimates$are$presented$in$the$last$column.$All$regressions$include$
bank$ and$ country$ control$ variables$ (not$ reported):$ activity,$ efficiency,$ bank$ size,$ gdpgrowth,$ log(inflation),$ and$ the$ banking$ sector’s$
concentration$ratio.$In$all$regressions,$we$include$country$dummies.$The$robust$standard$errors$are$clustered$at$the$country$level.$***,**,$
and$*$denote$significance$at$the$1%,$5%,$and$10%$levels,$respectively.$$
Performance&measure& At&intervention& After&intervention& $
(LOG)ZSCORE&(I)& NonXintervened& Intervened& Difference& NonXintervened& Intervened&&&&Difference&& DiffXinXDiff&
GUARANTEE&
$ $ $ $ $ & &
$
1.569 4.296 2.727***& 1.924 0.650 $$$$$$X1.274*** X4.001***
$
(0.862)$ (0.515)$ (0.828)& (0.442)$ (0.416)$ (0.220)& (0.996)&
R2=0.448$
       Number$of$obs.=757$
       LIQUDITY&
       
$
2.593$ 2.313$ X0.280& 1.488$ 1.036$$$$$$ &X0.452*& X0.172&
$
(0.917)$ (1.141)$ (1.118)& (0.555)$ (0.654)$ (0.244)& (1.142)&
R2=$0.374$
       Number$of$obs.=757$
       NATIONALIZATION&
       
$
1.669$ 3.060$ 1.391& 1.529$ 0.722$$$$$$$X0.807**& X2.198&
$
(1.236)$ (1.438)$ (1.933)& (0.462)$ (0.507)$ (0.311)& (2.096)&
R2=0.227$
       $       &Number$of$obs.=1010$        
& $ $ & $ $ & &
MERGER& 3.190 0.099 X3.090*** 1.624 1.541$$$$$$ X0.083 3.007*** 
$
(1.220)$ (0.648)$ (0.777)& (0.540)$ (0.606)$ (0.198)& (0.802)&
$
$ $ & $ $ & &
AMC& 2.705 2.443 X0.262 1.597 1.000$$$$$$ X0.597** X0.335 
$
(0.935)$ (1.075)$ (1.122)& (0.522)$ (0.512)$ (0.225)& (1.220)&
$
$ $ & $ $ & &
R2=$0.381$
$ $ & $ $ $ $Number$of$obs.=757$ $ $ & $ $ $ $
EQUITY&RATIO&(II)&
& & & & & & &GUARANTEE& $ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
32.901$ 30.251$ X2.650& 32.810$ 28.954$$$$$$ X3.857**& X1.206&
$
(7.227)$ (6.812)$ (1.772)& (6.903)$ (6.428)$ (1.591)& (1.703)&
R2=$0.266$
       Number$of$obs.=$1057$
       LIQUDITY&
       
$
32.015$ 27.752$$$$$$X4.263***& 31.348$ 28.107$ X3.241**& 1.022&
$
(7.178)$ (6.837)$ (1.398)& (6.797)$ (6.623)$ (1.212)& (1.668)&
R2=$0.270$
       Number$of$obs.=1057$
       NATIONALIZATION&
       
$
32.544$ 28.670$ X3.873*& 32.046$ 28.913$$$$$ &X3.134**& 0.740&
$
(7.417)$ (7.253)$ (2.079)& (7.136)$ (6.711)$ (1.322)& (2.086)&
R2=0.263$
       Number$of$obs.=1057$
       MERGER&
       
$
32.869$ 32.163$ X0.706& 32.618$ 31.925$$$$$$ X0.693& 0.013&
$
(7.343)$ (6.797)$ (1.395)& (6.953)$ (6.635)$ (1.154)& (1.208)&
R2=0.252$
       Number$of$obs.=1057$
       &
&
AMC&
       
$
32.290$ 29.471$ X2.819*& 31.929$ 28.624$$$$$$ X3.305**& X0.486&
$
(7.077)$ (6.552)$ (1.503)& (6.678)$ (6.423)$ (1.346)& (1.698)&
R2=0.266$
       Number$of$obs.=1057$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$
&
&




GUARANTEE& $ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
73.337$ 65.999$ X7.338& 73.445$ 61.392$ X12.053*& X4.715&
$
(13.159)$ (12.207)$ (8.313)& (12.246)$ (10.637)$ (5.869)& (3.962)&
R2=0.486$
       Number$of$obs.=997$
       LIQUDITY&
       
$
70.746$ 61.471$ X9.275& 69.794$ 60.737$ X9.056**& 0.218&
$
(12.880)$ (12.921)$ (6.963)& (11.968)$ (11.932)$ (3.981)& (4.103)&
R2=0.486$
       Number$of$obs.=997$
       NATIONALIZATION&
       
$
70.924$ 63.369$ X7.555& 71.073$ 57.936$ X13.137**& X5.582&
$
(12.469)$ (11.409)$ (6.300)& (11.889)$ (10.846)$ (5.550)& (5.062)&
R2=$0.491$
      &Number$of$obs.=997$
       MERGER&
       
$
72.524$ 73.153$ 0.629& 72.811$ 69.401$ X3.411& X4.040&
$
(13.343)$ (13.114)$ (5.999)& (12.553)$ (12.366)$ (3.177)& (4.288)&
R2=0.470$
       Number$of$obs.=997$
       AMC&
       
&
71.712$ 68.742$ X2.970& 72.058$ 63.941$ X8.116***& X5.147&
$
(12.546)$ (12.679)$ (5.072)& (11.902)$ (10.917)$ (2.449)& (4.795)&
R2=0.479$
       Number$of$obs.=997$















Table& VI:$ Effectiveness& of& policy& measures& in& improving& banks’& performance& under& various&
intervention&programs&
The$table$presents$difference=in=difference$(DID)$estimations$of$banks$performance$measured$by$the$log(zscore).$Banks$are$grouped$into$
those$ supported$ by$ a$ single$ policy$ measure$ (blanket$ guarantee,$ liquidity$ provisions,$ nationalization,$ and$ the$ use$ of$ AMC)$ and$ those$
supported$ by$ a$ combination$ of$ policy$ measures$ as:$ 1)$ guarantee$ with$ liquidity$ provisions,$ 2)$ nationalization$ with$ use$ of$ an$ AMC,$ 3)$
government=assisted$mergers$with$use$of$an$AMC,$4)$guarantee$with$nationalization$and$AMC,$5)$liquidity$provisions$with$nationalization,$
and$6)$AMC,$ liquidity$provisions$with$government=assisted$mergers.$The$estimates$show$differences$ in$bank$performance$at$the$time$of$
intervention$ and$ over$ the$ next$ five$ years$ following$ government$ support.$ The$ DID$ estimates$ are$ presented$ in$ the$ last$ column.$ All$
regressions$ include$ bank$ and$ country$ control$ variables$ (not$ reported):$ activity,$ efficiency,$ bank$ size,$ gdpgrowth,$ log(inflation),$ and$ the$
banking$sector’s$concentration$ratio.$In$all$regressions,$we$include$the$country$dummies.$The$robust$standard$errors$are$clustered$at$the$
country$level.$***,**,$and$*$denote$significance$at$the$1%,$5%,$and$10%$levels,$respectively.$













GUARANTEE& $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ && &&
$
=0.385$ 3.693$ 4.078***& 0.619$ =0.347$ X0.965***& X5.044***&
$
(1.085)$ (1.054)$ (0.632)& (0.887)$ (0.871)$ (0.264)& (0.575)&
R2=0.488$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       LIQUDITY&
       
$
=0.388$ 1.486$ 1.875**& =0.388$ =0.338$ 0.050& X1.824**&
$
(0.987)$ (1.264)$ (0.788)& (0.987)$ (0.935)$ (0.322)& (0.735)&
R2=0.434$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       NATIONALIZATION&
       
$
=1.356$ 2.010$ 3.366***& =0.291$ =0.796$ X0.505*& X3.871***&
$
(1.254)$ (1.427)$ (1.146)& (0.946)$ (0.981)$ (0.245)& (1.187)&
R2=0.45575$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       &        
MERGER&
       
$
2.193$ =1.136$ X3.329**& =0.481$ =0.093$ 0.388*& 3.717***&
$
(1.607)$ (1.368)$ (1.192)& (1.075)$ (1.092)$ (0.199)& (1.207)&
R2=0.454$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       AMC&
       
$
=0.279$ 1.476$ 1.755**& =0.279$ =0.530$ X0.250& X2.005**&
$
(0.969)$ (1.250)$ (0.729)& (0.969)$ (0.985)$ (0.195)& (0.800)&
R2=0.438$
$ $ & $ $ & &Number$of$obs.=366$




$ $ & $ $ & &
$
=0.437$ 4.070$ 4.506***& 0.139$ =0.240$$$$$$ X0.379& X4.886***&
$
(0.951)$ (1.033)$ (0.424)& (0.935)$ (0.808)$ (0.311)& (0.376)&
R2=0.463$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       NATIONALIZATION*
AMC&
       
$
=1.213$ 2.081$ 3.294**& =0.421$ =0.753$$$$$$ X0.332& X3.627***&
$
(1.242)$ (1.524)$ (1.193)& (0.985)$ (0.989)$ (0.273)& (1.256)&
R2=0.448$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       MERGER*AMC&
       
$
2.230$ =1.122$ X3.352***& =0.377$ 0.021$$$$$$ X0.356& 3.708***&
$
(1.622)$ (1.342)$ (1.186)& (1.043)$ (1.081)$ (0.256)& (1.232)&
R2=0.449$
       Number$of$obs.=366$
       $        &
&
&








=0.382$ 3.966$ 4.348***& 0.432$ =0.401$ X0.833& X5.180***&
$
(1.199)$ (1.295)$ (0.460)& (1.286)$ (1.325)$ (0.265)& (0.504)&
R2=0.468$
       Number$of$obs.=339$
       $        LIQUIDITY*&
NATIONALIZATION*
AMC&
       
$
=0.853$ 2.501$ 3.354**& 0.049$ =0.141$ X0.189& X3.543***&
$
(1.363)$ (1.722)$ (1.210)& (1.276)$ (1.301)$ (0.315)& (1.178)&
R2=0.443$
       Number$of$obs.=339$
       $        LIQUIDITY*&
MERGER&
       
$
2.758$ =0.629$ X3.388**& 0.278$ 0.609$ 0.331& 3.718***&
$
(1.786)$ (1.424)$ (1.204)& (1.353)$ (1.481)$ (0.221)& (1.233)&
R2=0.448$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $Number$of$obs.=339$



















The$ table$presents$difference=in=differences$estimations$of$bank$performance$measured$by$ (log)z=scores.$Banks$ are$ grouped$ into$banks$
supported$ by$ single$ policy$ measures$ (blanket$ guarantee,$ liquidity$ provisions,$ nationalization,$ and$ use$ of$ an$ AMC).$ We$ differentiate$
countries$based$on$ level$of$ institutional$development,$using$ following$variables:$existence$of$explicit$deposit$protection,$ level$of$ capital$
requirements,$ and$ power$ of$ supervisory$ authorities.$ Countries$ are$ then$ divided$ into$ those$ with$ strong$ institutional$ infrastructure$
(institutional$ variable$ above$ the$ median)$ and$ those$ with$ weak$ institutional$ structures$ (institutional$ variable$ below$ the$ median).$ The$
estimates$show$the$differences$in$the$banks’$performance$at$the$time$of$intervention$and$as$an$average$over$the$five=year$period$following$
government$support.$The$DID$estimates$are$presented$in$the$last$column.$All$regressions$include$bank$and$country$control$variables$(not$
reported$ here)$ as:$ activity,$ efficiency,$ bank’s$ size,$ gdpgrowth,$ log(inflation),$ and$ the$ banking$ sector’s$ concentration$ ratio.$ The$ robust$
standard$errors$are$clustered$at$the$country$level.$***,**,$and$*$denote$significance$at$the$1%,$5%,$and$10%$levels,$respectively.$
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&At&intervention&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&After&intervention&
&&Log(zscore)&&&&&& NonXintervened& Intervened& Difference& &&NonXintervened& Intervened& Difference& DiffXinXDiff&
DEPOSIT&INSURANCE&SYSTEM$
GUARANTEE&
$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
0.160 4.443 4.283*** 0.160$ 0.037$$$$$$$ =0.122$ =4.406***
$
(1.317)$ (1.387)$ (0.300)$ (1.317)$ (0.951)$ (0.453)$ (0.538)$
R2=$0.601$
       Number$of$obs.=165$
       
LIQUDITY&
       
$
=2.275$ =1.416$ 3.691$ =3.207$ =3.073$$$$$$ 0.134$ =3.557$
$
(1.378)$ (1.439)$ (0.830)$ (1.659)$ (1.458)$ (0.416)$ (0.416)$
R2=$0.478$
       Number$of$obs.=165$
       
NATIONALIZATION&
       
$
=0.976$ =1.732$ =0.755$ =0.976$ =4.113$ =3.136***$ =2.381**$
$
(1.568)$ (2.438)$ (1.116)$ (1.568)$ (1.991)$ (0.560)$ (0.985)$
R2=0.644$
       Number$of$obs.=165$
       
MERGER&
       
$
=0.443$ 0.233$ 0.676$ =0.443$ 0.455$$$$$$$0.898***$ 0.222$
$
(1.218)$ (1.220)$ (0.527)$ (1.218)$ (1.347)$ (0.293)$ (0.472)$
R2=$0.553$
       Number$of$obs.=165$
       &
AMC&
       
$
0.889$ 3.414$ 2.525*$ 0.889$ 0.679$$$$$$$ =0.211$ =2.736**$
$
(1.771)$ (2.550)$ (1.343)$ (1.771)$ (1.738)$ (0.331)$ (1.210)$
R2=$0.552$




$ 0.505$ 4.911$ 0.505***$ $ $ 0.405$ 0.813$ 0.407 0.098*** 
$
(1.363)$ (2.111)$ (1.361)$ $ $ (1.275)$ (1.382) (0.286) (0.398) 
R2=$0.604$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=168$        
LIQUDITY&
   
      
$
=2.512$ 0.368$ 2.880**$ $ $ =2.667$ 3.744$ 1.077** =1.803 
$
(1.410)$ (2.015)$ (1.132)$ $ $ (1.652)$ (1.692)$ (0.434) (1.206) 
R2=0.499$
   
      











   





=3.879$ 3.386$ 7.265***$ $ $ =2.460$ =0.704$ 1.757** =5.508*** 
$
(1.654)$ (1.608)$ (1.497)$ $ $ (1.733)$ (1.178)$ (0.653) (1.654) 
R2=0.671$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=141$        
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
MERGER& $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
=1.055$ 0.256$ 1.310**$ $ $ =0.798$ 0.545$ =1,334** =0.024 
$
(1.096)$ (1.013)$ (0.593)$ $ $ (1.207)$ (1.148)$ (0.593) (0.191) 
R2=0.549$
    
    
Number$of$obs.=159$
       & $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
AMC& $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
0.591$ 6.144$ 5.553***$ $ $ 1.842$ 2.012$$$$$$$0.169 =5.384*** 
$
(1.398)$ (1.942)$ (0.787)$ $ $ (1.565)$ (1.599)$ (0.362) (0.883) 
R2=0.576$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $




$ $ $ $ $ $ $
$
0.496$ 6.044$$$ $$$$5.548***$ $ 0.496$ 1.668$ 1.172*$ =4.376***  
$
(1.215)$ (1.012)$ (0.457)$ $ (1.215)$ (0.753)$ (0.633)$ (0.397)  
R2=0.602$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=168$          
LIQUDITY&
   
      
$
=2.275$ =2.139$ 0.136$ $ =2.449$ =4.337$ =1.888***$ =2.024  
$
(1.378)$ (1.954)$ (1.247)$ $ (1.643)$ (1.598)$ (0.262)$ (1.191)  
R2=0.487$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
Number$of$obs.=179$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $  
NATIONALIZATION&
   
      
$
=3.879$ 4.634$ 8.513$ $ =2.460$ 0.545$ 3.005***$ =5.508***  
$
(1.654)$ (1.857)$ $$$$$$$$$$$(1.671)$ $ (1.733)$ (1.438)$ (0.551)$ (1.654)  
R2=0.670$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=141$          
MERGER&
   
      
$
=0.519$ 1.443$ 3.136***$ $ =0.336$ =0.154$ 0.182$ =2.954  
$
(2.438)$ (2.115)$ (0.560)$ $ (1.210)$ (1.476)$ (0.449)$ (0.449)  
R2=0.528$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=159$
   
      
AMC&
   
      
$
0.601$ 4.000$$$$$ $$3.399***$ $ 1.839$ =0.162$ =2.001***$ =5.400***  
$
(1.375)$ (1.386)$ (0.441)$ $ (1.534)$ (1.011)$ (0.581)$ (0.853)  
R2=0.576$
   
      
Number$of$obs.=189$ $$ $$ $$ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
$
$
$
